Corruption and Entrepreneurship in Kenya by Ngunjiri, Irene












Africa has many bridges that dot the landscape with no roads to lead to them. This is 
because many projects are started but never get completed due to corruption. The bridge is 
completed but government often run out of funds to build the road. Corruption has become 
a common phenomenon in many developing and emerging economies. There are different 
views on the effects of corruption on entrepreneurship. What is clear is that 
entrepreneurship is paramount for economic growth. Entrepreneurship development is 
driven by a number of factors principally social, psychological and economic. All these 
factors are subject to corruption and consequently can deter entrepreneurship. This paper 
examines the impact of corruption on entrepreneurship in Kenya. The findings indicate 
that when formal institutions are inefficient corruption which subverts these institutions is 
beneficial in terms of economic development. Conversely, where formal institutions are 
relatively efficient, corruption is detrimental. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Corruption was the buzz word for the National Rainbow Coalition (Narc), the winning 
party, during the 2002 election campaign in Kenya. John Githongo1, a political analyst and 
former journalist, described corruption in Kenya as being systemic, endemic. It pervades all 
the levels of the nation (2003). Kenya has been fraught with a number of scandals among 
them Goldenberg, Anglo leasing, Maize, oil, Grand/ Laico Regency among others. Kenya 
remains in the bottom 20 percent of Transparency International's Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 2The fact that it persists there, at least in terms of perception, makes Kenya 
appear one of the world's most corrupt countries. Kenya has had a number of commissions 
set up to unravel the scandals but all of them have proved to be an exercise in futility3  A 
survey done in 2004 by the World Bank and the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research 
shows that graft still oils the wheels of business in Kenya. Half of the firms surveyed said 
that they had been asked for a bribe in the past year.  
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In (1996) the World Bank rated Kenya as the 17th poorest nation in the world However, it 
fares fairly well when compared to its immediate neighbors although according to the 2008 
CPI it is perceived to be most corrupt in Eastern Africa. Kenya, the regional hub for trade 
and finance in East Africa, is hampered by corruption and reliance on several primary 
goods whose prices remain low.4 Kenya's economy has stagnated with GDP growth failing 
to keep up with the rate of population growth. In 1997, the IMF suspended Kenya's 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program due to the government's failure to maintain 
reforms and curb corruption.  
One of the primary determinants of growth is entrepreneurship, the ability of a nation‘s 
citizens, and of foreign investors, to engage in building new businesses, or in restructuring 
existing establishments in order to adjust to changes in the economic and political 
environment. Economic growth is aided by entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship, in turn, 
may be facilitated by economic growth (Wilkin 1979, 25). This symbiotic relationship makes 
separating cause and effect difficult. Nevertheless, economists from Schumpeter to Rostow 
have argued that the innovational part of entrepreneurship is crucial for economic 
development and growth. It is entrepreneurship that leads to higher productivity, the 
ability to produce more from the same amount of work: economic growth (Palifka, 2006).  
Corruption drastically affects economic development by causing a misallocation of 
resources. What is damaging to an economy is the fact that in endemically corrupt systems, 
regular people are not getting served by the government and as they don't trust the 
government they don't interact with the government. As these people have to get things 
done, they create their own systems to do things, such as resolve disputes or enforce 
contacts or get ways to circumvent the rules and laws. Economic development depends on 
change. The agent of change is the individual entrepreneur responding to the incentives 
embodied in the institutional framework.Corruption is an informal institution that 
influences entrepreneurship (Mbaku, 1996). 
 
1.1 Entrepreneurship 
There seems to be no agreement on the definition of entrepreneurship. Chell et al (1991) 
state that the problem of identification of the entrepreneur has been confounded by the fact 
that there is still no standard universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship. Often the 
term entrepreneurship is equated to new venture creation and small business management 
Gibb (1999). Baumol (1987) points out that most neo- classical economists recognize that 
there three primary economic factors of production:  raw materials, labor and capital. These 
components have to be brought together by individuals. Some economists regard 
entrepreneurship as a kind of fourth factor which acts on the other three to combine them 
in productive ways (Kirby, 2003).  
Entrepreneurs operate within both economic and societal contexts. Not only do they make 
the economic system more competitive but they drive changes in the structure of society. 
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Wickham (1998) has proposed that there is a hierarchy of entrepreneurial activities 
operating in different social areas. At the core or base is what is conventionally known as 
entrepreneurship namely the profit making business venture; at the next level there is the 
management of the not for profit organizations such as charities and public sector 
institutions, above this is the social and cultural activities, while at the top are activities 
aimed at creating wholesale social change such as political activity Kirby, (2003). 
Entrepreneurship  involves not only the process that leads to the setting up of a business 
entity but also the expansion and development of an ongoing concern.  
Entrepreneurship is a vast subject as it does not alone correspond to a single academic 
discipline, but relates to numerous disciplines such as economics, sociology, demography, 
and psychology. Hence, it is a multifaceted and a multidisciplinary subject with complex 
social, cultural, and economic phenomena. But it requires creativity and innovation that 
are consistent with the healthy edge required to change the basis of competition. 
Entrepreneurship is at the top of the cultural, economic, and political agenda. It is 
considered as one of the main keys for unlocking economic growth, and as a result the 
policymakers worldwide have attempted to implement certain strategies that cherish and 
sustain entrepreneurial activity Michel J Lynskey, (2002). 
 
1.1.1Factors Contributing to Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship is studied as a process of creating new firms (Gartner, 1988; and Krueger 
and Brazeal, 1994). It involves exceptional kinds of decision-making process. The success of 
every venture depends on the entrepreneur's personality structure and on many other 
influences such as internal and external factors. If entrepreneurship is important for 
growth—that is, if entrepreneurship is an activity to be promoted—then it is necessary to 
identify ways to encourage entrepreneurship. Palifka, (2006) divided these into three 
groups: psychological factors, social factors, and economic factors. Each of these factors will 
be defined and areas that are vulnerable to corruption identified. Corruption is the abuse of 
public office for private gain. 
 
1.1.1.1 Psychological factors. 
These consist primarily of individual characteristics, determined genetically or in the home 
and they allow little scope for policy.  Ehigie et al (2003) found out that self-concept, 
perceived managerial competence, work stress and business commitment as important 
psychological variables for perceived entrepreneurial success among female entrepreneurs 
in Nigeria. Everett Hagen (1962) introduced the notion of innovative personality as the 
prerequisite for economic growth, spread of entrepreneurship and capital formation. The 
main psychological requirement is an innovational personality for an individual with 
imagination is less risk-averse, and is more likely to undertake investment projects. (Leff 
1979, 47) Although it might be argued that such a personality is determined exogenously by 
the parents‘ genes, it may also be true that creativity can be encouraged in the school or 
work environment. Specific skills common to entrepreneurs include: the ability to set 





realistic goals and defer gratification, a willingness to take risks, and possession of an 
internal locus of control.  
  
1.1.1.2 Social factors.  
The supply of entrepreneurs may be affected by a number of social factors, including social 
mobility, the degree of social integration, entrepreneurial and political security (―protection 
from unnecessary risks‖, e.g., the enforcement of patent laws), and the social/cultural 
legitimacy of entrepreneurial activity. The marginalization of some groups, especially the 
exclusion of educated groups from the political process, has been identified by Rostow 
(1975) and others as contributing to entrepreneurship, but excessive marginalization can be 
detrimental. (Wilkin, 8-14) A country‘s institutions may influence these social factors and 
policy can shape these institutions. Several of the social factors are vulnerable to 
corruption. Social mobility, for example, will be stunted especially by traditional forms of 
corruption such as nepotism: only those with close family connections will be able to move 
up. The enforcement of patent and other laws is an area that offers opportunities for 
corruption.  
 
1.1.1.3 Economic factors.  
Market incentives determine the demand for entrepreneurs. This demand will interact with 
the supply of entrepreneurs to arrive at the level of entrepreneurship in a given country or 
region. The most important incentives are the demand for industrial and other products, 
the availability of labor and raw inputs, the level of inflation, taxes, and barriers to the 
imports of necessary inputs. All of these may be affected by public policy; all may be subject 
to corruption. Further determinants of the demand for entrepreneurs are the cost of 
attaining information about markets, the distribution of income, and access to resources. 
These are especially important in relation to corruption. High information costs and limited 
access to resources may increase the potential gains from corruption, which subsequently 
limits access to resources and preserves the disparate distribution of income in a vicious, 
self-perpetuating circle.  
 
1.2 Corruption  
The World Bank defines corruption as the misuse of public power for private gain is and is 
difficult to measure directly because of secretive, dishonest nature.  Various indices are 
used, such as TI‘s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI: a meta-survey) Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), BEEPS, and 
Business International Index (BI). (Nye, 2002) states that corruption is behavior which 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close 
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of 
certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of 





a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of 
patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation 
(illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses) (Mbaku, 1996)  
David Bayley (1966: 720) argues that corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of 
bribery, is a general term covering the misuse of authority as a result of considerations of 
personal gain, which need not be monetary. Herbert Werlin (1973: 73) defines political 
corruption as the "diversion of public resources to nonpublic purposes. In Africa many 
people see corruption as a practical problem involving the outright theft, embezzlement of 
funds or other appropriation of state property, nepotism and the granting of favors to 
personal acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and position to exact payments 
and privileges" (Harsch 1993: 33) in (Mbaku, 1996). 
Prof Philip M. Nichols (2002) argues that corruption threatens the global market place as it 
affects the decisions made by the political leaders, reduces the efficacy of those in power 
and discourages internal and foreign investments. He further states that corruption and 
bribery have moved to the forefront in discussions about business and the list of countries 
that have been politically or economically crippled by corruption continues to grow, and 
businesses with long-term interests abroad will ultimately be harmed by any plans that 
include bribery. African leaders must reject the view that as individuals we are linked only 
by commercial transactions, and that we are accountable to no one, and need to justify our 
actions to nobody. 
Fraser Molekati, South Africa‘s ex- Minister of Public Service and Administration 1999 – 
2008, asserts that business and political leaders must be convinced that economic 
development cannot be at all costs. We cannot develop by allowing a permissive 
environment for corruption to flourish. Corruption is detrimental to long term sustainable 
development. Corruption costs and grand corruptions costs even more. Corruption is 
inimical to development; it perpetuates inequality, increases wealth and asset gaps 
between rich and poor on national, regional, continental and global scales. It reproduces 
conditions of underdevelopment and poverty. It is morally wrong and offensive; it is illegal 
and it can no longer be tolerated  
Many researchers have tried to explain the international discrepancies in corruption rates 
as being mainly due to the different formal institutional environment. Informal 
institutional aspects, such as culture bounded attitudes, norms, traditions and habits have 
been mostly neglected (Treisman, 2000). Corruption in developing countries is often 
believed to arise from the clash or conflict between traditional values and the imported 
norms that accompany modernization and socio-political development. Bureaucratic 
corruption is seen by some researchers, then, as an unavoidable outcome of modernization 









1.2.1 Types of corruption 
David Osterfeld (1992) has argued that in a heavily regulated economy, one can find two 
distinct types of corruption: "expansive corruption," which involves activities that improve 
the competitiveness and flexibility of the market; and "restrictive corruption," which limits 
opportunities for productive and socially beneficial exchange.  
Restrictive corruption, Osterfeld (1992) argues, is characterized by redistribution of income 
and wealth in favor of individuals or groups. Most public-sector corruption falls in the 
restrictive category and involves illegal appropriation of public resources for private use (e. 
g. outright embezzlement by a civil servant) or the illegal use of an individual's public 
position for his own personal enrichment. Public-sector corruption hinders the proper 
functioning of the market system, retards economic growth, and thus is restrictive 
corruption. As examples of expansive corruption, Osterfeld (1992,) mentions the bribing of 
judges, politicians and bureaucrats by members of the private sector. The payment of bribes 
to the right officials, he argues, can help mitigate the harmful effects of excessive 
government regulation and improve economic participation (Mbaku, 1996).  
Mullei (2003) classifies corruption into petty corruption, grand corruption and looting. Petty 
corruption involves relatively minor amounts of money or gifts changing hands where one 
of the parties is themselves a relatively minor official in the organisation or system within 
which the transaction takes place. For example, paying a policeman fifty shillings to ignore 
the fact that your car‘s licence has expired. Grand corruption most often involves 
businessmen and government officials of senior rank and the figures involved are 
significant. Examples of these are kick-backs paid to officials on government public works 
contracts. The third type of corruption is ‗looting‘ and has recently been described by some 
commentators as large-scale economic delinquency. It differs slightly from petty and grand 
corruption, however, and is sadly prevalent in those Third World countries where 
institutions of governance are particularly weak. It usually involves the kind of scams 
whose figures are so huge that when they are successfully concluded they have 
macroeconomic implications fairly quickly – they cause banks to collapse, inflation to rise, 
the exchange rate to decline.  
2.0 Corruption and entrepreneurship 
For profit-maximizing enterprises faced with ruinous government regulations, bureaucratic 
corruption can be viewed as a survival mechanism. In African countries, payments from 
entrepreneurs seeking state favors represent an important source of extra-legal income for 
civil servants. A society's laws and institutions have a significant impact on the level of 
bureaucratic corruption. State regulatory programs can place a significant burden on 
business enterprises and entrepreneurship and encourage investors to seek ways to 
minimize these state-imposed costs. Most intervention schemes, create rents that are 
usually competed for through a political process. Paying bribes to civil servants has 
emerged as an important method to compete for those rents (Mbaku, 1992) and (Harsch, 
1993).  





Although certain types of corruption may have beneficial economic and political effects, for 
example it may motivate tax officials, corruption can permit inefficient firms to remain in 
business indefinitely. Contrary to Osterfeld's (1992) claim, the firms offering the highest 
bribes are not necessarily the most economically efficient ones but the ones that are 
efficient at rent seeking. A study of the Yucatan, Margaret Goodman (1990: 642-43) found 
that corruption did not benefit efficient producers, but instead protected incompetent 
entrepreneurs. The firms that survived under institutionalized corruption were those that 
had become efficient at rent seeking, not at properly and effectively servicing their markets. 
The expertise that improved their ability to survive was their knowledge of the political 
process, who to bribe, and how to effectively manipulate the political system to their 
advantage. In addition, Goodman (1990) found that corruption in the Yucatan did not 
ensure new groups or entrepreneurs opportunities to enter the market. Instead, corruption 
allowed the old and more established groups to totally dominate and monopolize markets 
(Mbaku, 1996). 
Gary Becker (1994: 18) remarked that corruption is common whenever big government 
infiltrates all facets of economic life, never mind the political and business systems. If the 
country's rules make the political system the primary determinant of firm profitability, 
then entrepreneurs are likely to devote most of their resources, including their time, to rent 
seeking. For example, if state subsidies, discretionary tax relief, and other forms of 
regulations instead of managerial expertise, business acumen, and competition become the 
primary determinants of the profitability of firms, rent seeking, including bureaucratic 
corruption, would become pervasive. Entrepreneurs in such an economy will devote a 
significant portion of their activities to lobbying and bribing politicians and civil servants in 
an effort to maximize profit levels (Mbaku, 1996). 
 
Mauro finds ―that corruption is strongly negatively associated with the investment rate, 
regardless of the amount of red tape‖, asserting further that ―there is evidence that 
institutional inefficiency causes low investment.‖ (Mauro 1995, 695) Everhart and 
Sumlinski (2001) find that public investment ―crowds out‖ private investment and that in 
more corrupt countries, the crowding out effect is stronger. They argue that when 
government projects are tainted by corruption, the quality of infrastructure suffers and this 
discourages private investment. Taslim (1994) argues that corruption in the form of bribe-
taking is like sand in a machine rather than oil because it drives out firms with lower 
entrepreneurial skills from the market. Obviously, developing countries where 
entrepreneurial skills are in particular very scarce are adversely affected because there will 
be even fewer active entrepreneurs who can seek out profitable opportunities and directly 
add to the wealth of the nation in addition to enriching themselves. 
 
Sarkar and Hasan, (2001) noted that the presence of corruption inflicts substantial 
economic costs on an economy. Corruption is a double edged sword; it reduces both the 
volume and efficiency of investment and thus economic growth. They concluded that 
substantial gains in terms of economic growth could be achieved if corruption is reduced. 
Malesky and Krislert Samphantharak (2008) found out that firms exposed to a shock to 
their bribe schedules by a change in governor invest significantly less in subsequent 
periods, as they wait for new information about their chief executive. Predictability in the 





amount that the firm is going to pay in bribes is critically important in individual firm 
investment decisions. The finding is robust to a battery of firm-level controls and province-
level investment climate measures. Further they alluded to the fact that changes in 
governor are most strongly associated with changes in corruption predictability, not other 
measures of general stability in the business environment.  
 
Corruption affects entrepreneurship in a myriad of ways. By limiting access to government 
funds and permits, the government agents reduce participation in some kinds of 
entrepreneurial activity to their own circle of friends and relatives, or to people who have 
access to this circle and can get a representative. In this respect, personal relations 
represent a kind of social capital (Bezerra 1994, 5) in scarce supply. Funds and contracts go 
not to the best proposals, but to those proposals which have sponsors within the agency in 
charge. At the same time, this corruption reduces the rewards for merit and reinforces the 
belief that the only roads to success are through luck or through corruption, and not 
through education. Thus the returns to education are perceived to be low, resulting in lower 
enrollment rates than would be observed in the absence of corruption. The waiving of 
technical audits, however, reduces government expenditures on gathering information, 
potentially leaving more funds for entrepreneurial projects. The risk is that the projects will 
not be technically or economically viable (Palifka, 2006). 
Khan and Toufique (1995) argued that corruption does have positive effects on 
entrepreneurship. According to them can act as grease to the wheels of economic growth in 
the following ways: Bypasses government inefficiency (Red Tape Model); Might increase 
motivation of tax officials; Bribes may provide market mechanisms, but lack of legal 
transactional assurance and secret/uncompetitive nature of bribes reduces efficiency. 
Taslim also argued that corruption actually increased entrepreneurship since 
entrepreneurs have often sought out corrupt transactions as cost-reducing strategies. 
 
Nathaniel Leff (1964) launched inquiry into the possibility that corruption may be a 
positive phenomenon under some circumstances. When formal institutions are inefficient 
(e.g., red tape that strangles investment), corruption which subverts these institutions is 
beneficial in terms of economic development. Conversely, where formal institutions are 
relatively efficient, corruption is detrimental. What we should bear in mind is that many 
developing countries are underdeveloped administratively as well as economically, and it is 
this administrative inefficiency which makes corruption socially optimal. Nevertheless, 
corruption with inefficient formal institutions is arguably worse than efficient formal 
institutions with no corruption (Palifka, 2006). 
 
3.0 Measuring the effects of corruption on entrepreneurship in Kenya 
 
TI-Kenya‘s has for the last seven years constructed the Kenya Bribery Index (KBI). The 
survey is part of its effort to inform the fight against corruption with rigorous and objective 
research and analysis. The survey captures as experienced by ordinary citizens in their 
interaction with officials of both public and private organizations. The respondents were 
asked to provide information on the organizations where they have encountered bribery 





during the past year, how much they paid, for what and their perception of corruption in 
the country.  
3.1 Corruption rankings of organizations 
On the Aggregate Index scale of 0-100 the respondents were asked to indicate how corrupt 
they perceived certain organizations to be. Table I gives the findings. 
Table 1: Corruption rankings of organizations in Kenya in 2008 
 
Rank Organization Aggregate Index 
1 Kenya Police 57 
2 Other Local Authorities/Ministry of Local Government. 47 
3 Ministry of Lands 37 
4 Immigration Dept. 36 
5 Private Universities 34 
6 Provincial Administration 33 
7 Nairobi City Council 31 
Source: KBI 2008 
 
The Kenya Police, Local Authorities/the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of 
Lands have a high degree of continuity in the top rankings. The police have a greater 
capacity to extract a bribe. Generally failure to comply with a bribe demand by the police 
usually results in failure to access a certain service or avoid a penalty. In Kenya the police 
are perceived to be widely corrupt and people are often surprised when we encounter an 
honest policeman. It must also be noted that the high score by the police could also be due 
to the fact that the services that they provide are on high demand. Entrepreneurs will go to 
the police to report crimes or to have disputes resolved. Local authorities are responsible for 
collecting land rates and rent and issuing of trading licenses. Corruption in this sector 
could slow down the efforts of entrepreneurs to venture into new businesses. 
 
3.2 Total bribery payments 
The respondents were asked to indicate the total bribery payments in 2007. Table 2 below 
shows the responses. 
 
Table 2: Total bribery payments by respondents in 2008 
 
 
Amount Paid (KSh.) Frequency Percent of Sample 
0 568 24 
1- 200 212 8 
201-500 226 9 
501-1,000 241 10 
1,001-2,000 243 10 
2,001-5,000 324 14 
5,001-10,000 208 9 





10,001-20,000 204 9 
20,000+ 174 7 
TOTAL 2400 100 
 
Source: KBI 2008 
 
The proportion of respondents who did/did not make bribery payments over the previous 
year: 76 and 24 percent, respectively as shown in table 2 above. The bribes paid by 50% of 
the respondents are above kshs. 1,000. Considering that more than half of the population in 




3.3 The purpose for the bribe and the Average size of the bribe 
 
The respondents were asked to state the purpose of paying bribes out of the following five: 
(1) to obtain some service (―service‖), (2) to obtain some license or permit and thus comply 
with some law or regulation (―regulatory compliance‖), (3) to avoid a fine or some other 
punitive measure (―law enforcement‖), (4) to facilitate a contract or commercial transaction 




Table 3: Number of Transactions (Percent of Total) vs. the purpose for the bribe payment in 
2008 
 
Year  2008  2007  2006 
Service  45 29 26 
Regulatory Compliance 19 24 20 
Law Enforcement 24 36 46 
Business 6 7 4 
Employment 6 4 3 
Source: KBI 2008 
 
         
Fig 1: Showing the Average size of Bribes Paid 
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Source: KBI 2008 
     
          
From table 3 and Fig I above it clear that a typical entrepreneur will have to pay bribes to 
obtain services from government offices, to obtain licenses to start their business, to avoid 
fines and to facilitate contracts or commercial transaction. Effectively he may have to pay 
kshs, 10,280 on average to get the business going. Corruption in this area may create 
barriers to entry for small enterprises.  
 
3.4 Corruption perceptions 
 
The survey also captured general perceptions of corruption in the country. Table 4 presents 
the findings as compared to those in the previous three KBIs. It emerges that there was 
little change. The only notable movement was towards the negative, with a total perception 
of this nature (i.e., ―a lot worse‖ + ―a little worse‖) increasing from 13, 18, 20, 18 over the 





Table 4: Changes In Perceptions of Corruption: 2008 Vs. Previous (Percent) 
 
Perceived Change 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
A little better 22 20 15 15 18 





A lot better 13 15 11 10 14 
A little worse 10 7 7 6 4 
A lot worse 17 11 13 12 9 
No change 37 47 55 56 55 
Source: KBI 2008 
 
Kenyans seem to see the probability of encountering a bribe to be increasing over the years. 
With time there seems to be a shift in the government‘s focus from combating corruption to 
politics. Investors would shy away from a country where there is one has to bribe so as to 




It is clear the entrepreneurs may be spending some of their time and energy in 
unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship looking for ways to influence government 
officials. Entrepreneurs have to be creative in devising mechanisms to get around corrupt 
systems. Corruption undermines policies designed to encourage entrepreneurship. There is 
no way to determine the precise effect that corruption has on entrepreneurship. What is 
clear from the Corruption Perception index by Transparency International is that countries 
that rank high on the list are high rates of economic growth.  
Corruption prevents economic growth because it distorts incentives and market signals 
leading to misallocation of resources. Moreover, corruption in Kenya, where it has 
degenerative impact, destroys the productive capacity of local talent and entrepreneurs. 
The opportunities for corrupt practices lead to resources, especially human resources, being 
channeled into rent seeking rather than productive activities Entrepreneurial and 
academic skills may be attracted to public sectors to earn extra benefit through corruption. 
Entrepreneurs may also find it financially more rewarding to leave the private sector and 
instead become a corrupt public official. As a result, growth of private sector may be  
reduced. 
 
Kenya is currently trying to put its act together so as to institute reforms in a number of 
sectors of the economy. These reforms may aid in the removal of long standing traditions of 
corruption. One thing that is clear is that for this to happen there has to be political will 
and a paradigm shift among Kenyans. We need to believe that we can conduct business in 
all sectors without the intervention of corruption mechanisms and that it is possible to 
deinstitutionalize corruption. Long term measures to be taken that aim at fundamentally 
changing the formal institutions.  Short term measures such as corruption campaigns serve 
to reduce corruption only when they are in effect.  
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